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The value of vulnerability: The transformative capacity of risky trust
Luigino Bruni∗ Fabio Tufano†
Abstract
In an experimental gift-exchange game, we explore the transformative capacity of vulnerable trust, which we define as
trusting untrustworthy players when their untrustworthiness is common knowledge between co-players. In our experiment,
there are two treatments: the “Information” treatment and the “No-Information” treatment in which we respectively disclose
or not information about trustees’ trustworthiness. Our laboratory evidence consistently supports the transformative capacity
of trustors’ vulnerable trust, which generates higher transfers, more trustworthiness and increased reciprocity by untrustworthy
trustees.
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1 Introduction
Behavioural and social scientists have been increasingly
studying trust and its properties (e.g., Balliet et al., 2013;
Fehr, 2009; Johnson&Mislin, 2011). Still, much needs to be
understood about trust, particularly in non-enforceable, per-
sonalised interactions. The study reported here investigates
experimentally trustees’ response when the intentional vul-
nerability of the trustor is both manifestly salient and clearly
dependent upon the trustee’s revealed trustworthiness.
That trust – when not purely self-interested and instru-
mental – involves vulnerability is acknowledged in the inter-
disciplinary literature on trust (e.g., Rousseau et al., 1998;
Schoorman et al., 2007). Vulnerability, however, is often
interpreted only as unintentional “exposure” to other peo-
ple’s action or events, normally due to lack of resources,
rights, capabilities, empowerment or freedom.1 The devel-
opment of human wellbeing and dignity is usually measured
in terms of reduction or elimination of this unintentional vul-
nerability. At the same time, some philosophers and social
scientists claim also for a purposeful vulnerability, related to
the inherent fragility associated to good life (e.g., Nussbaum,
1986).
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Vulnerability pervades themost diverse social interactions
(ranging from education tomanagement; from family to pub-
lic life) whenever one party, the trustor, intentionally entrust
her “fate” to another party, the trustee, who is free to behave
in ways that may be beneficial but even in ways that may be
harmful for the trustor. This could be the case, for instance,
of a grassroots manager trusting a selfish young footballer to
play for the team in the cup final. The young footballer may
betray her trust and use the cup final to showcase his skills,
with little consideration of the team’s objectives; or, given
his history of selfish player and aware of the intentional vul-
nerability of the manager’s trust, the footballer may change
behaviour and reciprocate her trust by playing to benefit the
team.
Everyday life shows abundant evidence that without this
purposeful, intentional, vulnerability, human life does not
flourish fully, and organizations do not fulfil entirely their
potential.
By means of a gift-exchange experiment, in this paper we
study trustee’s response to trustor’s intentional vulnerability
and, consequently, the transformative capacity of vulnerable
trust, which we conceptualise as the possibility that trusting
untrustworthy individuals may change their responses from
untrustworthy responses to trustworthy ones. To the best of
our knowledge, no experiment has been conducted so far to
investigate the effects of trusting untrustworthy individuals,
when this specific vulnerability is common knowledge and is
made salient by its manifest intentionality. In what follows,
we refer to the trustor’s risk to be potentially betrayed by
the trustee, who proved to be untrustworthy (i.e., by sending
back less than what received) in a recent interaction with a
third person, as trustor’s vulnerability. Our general concern
is: Does vulnerable trust increase trustees’ transfers? Does it
transform trustees’ attitudes by making their behaviour more
trustworthy and reciprocal? Our laboratory evidence says
unambiguously yes to both questions. Intentional vulnera-
bility of trust shows sizeably increases in trustee’s transfers.
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Trustees’ behaviour becomes also more trustworthy and re-
ciprocal when vulnerability is made salient. We discuss the
policy implications of our results in significant domains of
social and economic life such as management and educa-
tion, where personalised interactions are characterised by
non-enforceable trust.
2 Trust, Risk and Vulnerability
Berg et al. (1995), Pillutla et al. (2003), Malhotra (2004)
and Strassmair (2009) dealt with issues similar to our own
by explicitly investigating in an experimental setting the
role of trustors’ risk exposure with regard to trustees’ be-
haviour.2 These studies did not find any significant effect of
the trustor’s exposure on the trustee’s behaviour. These re-
sults depend on critical features of the experimental designs,
which – we believe – were not purposely built to investigate
what we refer to as the transformative effect of vulnerability
on trustee’s behaviour.
In particular, in Berg et al. (1995) and Pillutla et al. (2003),
whenever trustors took higher risks by sending larger por-
tions of their endowment, they provided greater benefit to
trustees as a consequence. Thus, there is no possibility to
know whether trustees reciprocated because they valuated
the risks trustors had undertaken, or for distributional rea-
sons – or for both.
Malhotra’s (2004) study is the closest to our own study,
with a specific acknowledgement of the role of the trustor’s
risk. He found no significant impact of the trustor’s risk on
the trustee’s trustworthiness, which is instead significantly
affected by the benefit provided to them by the trustor. In
contrast with previous studies,Malhotra’s (2004) experimen-
tal design maintained a clear separation between the effect
of the trustor’s risk and the trustee’s benefit, but still the
trustor’s intentional vulnerability was not manifestly salient
and clearly dependent upon the trustee’s revealed trustwor-
thiness. In fact, in his study the only dimension of risk ex-
posure experimentally manipulated was the variation in the
material payoffs of the trustor’s outside option. We claim
that this strategy is not able to analyse the role of trustor’s in-
tentional vulnerability, i.e. the specific risk of being betrayed
inherent to trustor’s interaction with a given (untrustworthy)
trustee.
Strassmair (2009) studied the effect of trustors’ expected
future rewards on trustees’ reciprocal responses. To this aim,
she experimentally varied across treatments the probability
for the trustee to make a return transfer. In all her exper-
imental treatments, the probability of a return transfer was
made common knowledge when subjects were instructed.
In Strassmair’s (2009) “low” treatment, the probability for
the trustees of making their return transfer was 50%; in
2Cialdini (1993) and Reagan (1971) dealt with risk and reciprocity, but
the issue of vulnerability was not part of their analysis.
her “high” treatment, the respective probability was 80%.
Therefore, in the low treatment the trustee were expected
to perceive the trustor as kinder than in the high treatment,
ceteris paribus, and therefore they were expected to return
more in the former than in the later treatment whenever asked
to make a decision. The results, however, did not show any
significant difference across treatments: in fact, trustees did
not condition their transfers on trustors’ expected future re-
wards. Therefore, she suggested that trustees are insensitive
to the specific risk faced by the trustors and, consequently,
how risky trustors’ trust was. But, again, also in Starssmair’s
experiment the specific dimension of intentional vulnerabil-
ity was not salient enough, due to the mediational role played
by the probability of making a return transfer, and did not
depend upon the trustee’s revealed trustworthiness.
In fact, the contribution of our paper is to explore the
role of intentional vulnerability. The vulnerability of trust is
explained as a disposition of the trustor to accept the risk to
be intentionally betrayed by the trustee (Baier, 1986). This
disposition emerges only in context of human relationships
in which the presence of people and their intentions – rather
than other elements of the decision context – explains the
possibility to feel betrayed rather than the mere possibility
to be disappointed.
Thus, we consider the presence of people and their in-
tentions as a first necessary condition for the vulnerability
of trust as we intend it. However, it does not constitute a
sufficient condition to explain the emergence and the role of
intentional vulnerability. As also Holton (2004) underlines,
a person could choose to undertake actions based on trust
without taking the risk to be betrayed (e.g., when interact-
ing with an absolutely trustworthy person), that is, without
any particular vulnerability. This leads to what we consider
a second necessary condition for the vulnerability of trust:
that is, the risk of trusting depends on the trustee’s revealed
level of trustworthiness.
Upon maintaining the first condition in each and every
experimental treatment as in previous related studies (e.g.,
Blount, 2005; Falk et al. 2008; Stanca et al. 2009; Stanca,
2010), we design our experiment to explore the effect of the
second condition once the trustee’s revealed level of trustwor-
thiness has been made manifestly salient. We hypothesise
that, when the second condition also holds, trustors’ vul-
nerability may have a transformative effect on the response
of untrustworthy trustees.3 This is what we investigate by
means of our experiment as detailed below.
3For instance, we speculate that when the second condition holds
trustors’ vulnerability may prompt trustees to regard norms of altruism,
reciprocity, and fairness as relevant for the circumstances they are in, and
behave accordingly rather than following the norm of self-interest (e.g.,
Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001). However, it could also be the case
that behaviour in line with norms of altruism, reciprocity and fairness is
the intuitive behaviour triggered without deliberation (e.g., Rand, 2016, on
cooperation as resulting from more intuitive or deliberative processes).
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 12, No. 4, July 2017 Eﬀect of trustor vulnerability on trustworthiness 410
3 Experimental Design and Proce-
dures
We employ a two-player symmetric gift-exchange game
(Stanca et al., 2009). Both players receive an initial en-
dowment of 5 tokens each. In line with the literature on trust
(e.g., Bohnet, 2008), we refer to the first mover as the trustor
and the second mover as the trustee. In Stage 1, the trustor
decides how many of her 5 tokens (only integers could be
disposed) to send to the trustee. Then, the x tokens sent by
the trustor are multiplied by 3 by the experimenter. There-
fore, the trustee receives 3x. In Stage 2, the trustee decides
how many of his 5 tokens (only integers could be disposed)
to send to the trustor. Then, the y tokens sent by the trustee
are multiplied by 3 by the experimenter. Thus, the trustor re-
ceives 3y. In summary, the trustor’s final payoff of the game
is 5 − x + 3y, while the trustee’s final payoff is 5 + 3x − y.
Within each experimental session, the game was played
three times. We refer to those three times as Game 1, 2
and 3, respectively. Players learned about the games step by
step. Players’ roles – namely either trustor or trustee – were
fixed across games. A stranger matching protocol was in
place: that is, Game 1–3 were each played with a different
co-player. Only in Stage 2 of Game 3 we applied a variant
of the strategy method similar to the one implemented in
Fischbacher et al. (2001): that is, the trustee in such a stage
had to make a set of six conditional decisions (i.e., one per
possible number of tokens they could receive from the trustor
they were paired with) without knowing how many tokens
the trustor actually sent. In all other stages, the decision
method was always applied entailing a single unconditional
decision about how many tokens from the initial endowment
a player sent to their co-player.
One of the three games, 1–3, was randomly selected for
payment. For trustors, the single unconditional decision in
the selected game was used to determine the game payoffs
relevant for payment. For trustees, if either Game 1 or 2
was selected the single unconditional decision was used to
determine the game payoffs relevant for payment, whereas if
Game 3 was selected the conditional decision corresponding
to their trustor’s unconditional decision was used. Exper-
imental earnings were obtained by converting the payoffs
of the selected game in euros (exchange rate: 2 tokens = 1
euro), plus 5 euros as show-up fee.
There are two treatments in the experiment: the Infor-
mation treatment (I-treatment) and No-Information treat-
ment (N-treatment). The experimental manipulation be-
tween treatments is the disclosure or not of information
about the trustee’s choice in Game 1. In fact, in Game 2
and 3 of the I-treatment, trustors are informed whether their
co-player made either a “trustworthy” or an “trustworthy”
choice in Game 1, while trustees were made aware that their
trustor co-players were informed whether they made either
a “trustworthy” or a “trustworthy” choice in Game 1. By
contrast, in Game 2 and 3 of the N-treatment, no informa-
tion about Game 1 was disclosed. To effectively and swiftly
inform trustors about trustees’ revealed trustworthiness, a
trustee’s choice in Game 1 was labelled as “trustworthy” (vs.
“untrustworthy”) if they sent to their co-player a number of
token larger than or equal to (vs. lower than) the tokens they
received. (The experimental instructions rather than “trust-
worthy” used the more neutral Italian term “equo” – or its
negation – that could be more closely translated in English
with the word “fair”). The two treatments were identical in
all other respects.
The experiment started with instructions read aloud by
the experimenters to set ground rules. Then, subjects were
led step by step by computerized instructions in z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). After going through Games 1–3, sub-
jects learned the game randomly selected for payment, their
choice, their opponent’s choice and their earnings. The ex-
periment ended with a standard background questionnaire.
Two-hundred eight students (of whom 59.62 percent en-
rolled in undergraduate degrees) drawn from a range of aca-
demic disciplines (with Business and Economics summing
up respectively to 50.96 percent and 17.79 percent of the
whole sample) participated in our experiment, which took
place at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the Uni-
versity of Milano-Bicocca (Italy) and lasted on average one
hour. Subjects were paid individually and anonymously at
the end of each experimental session.4
4 Predictions
The present study focuses on the behavioural implications
of the vulnerability of trust. To explore those implications,
it is necessary to concentrate the attention on the trustee.
Therefore, in what follows, the predictions are stated with
regard to trustees’ behaviour.
Upon assuming that players are purely self-interested and
this is common knowledge, the trustee who is at the game
terminal node will always send zero tokens to the trustor.
By backward induction, the trustor will rationally choose to
not send any token to the trustee. Therefore, the standard
equilibrium prediction is that both players will send zero
tokens. However, we do not expect many players to behave
this way.
More importantly in the present case, if trustee’s pref-
erences show concerns for the vulnerability of trust, the
amount of tokens sent back by them should be higher when
the trustor’s vulnerability is salient.
4All subjects received the total sum of the actual earnings from the
experiment as described in the main text plus a € 5.00 show-up fee. Total
payments ranged between € 5.00 and € 15.00 with an average payment equal
to € 9.40 (standard deviation of € 3.12).
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Table 1: Summary statistics of token transfers by treatment, game and type of player.
Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) N
N-treatment
Trustor’s transfer 3.077 (1.702) 3.192 (1.783) 2.135 (1.961) 52
Trustee’s transfer 1.885 (1.843) 1.885 (1.916) 1.474 (0.996) 52
I-treatment
Trustor’s transfer 2.846 (1.564) 2.365 (1.794) 2.731 (2.097) 52
Trustee’s transfer 1.712 (1.730) 1.981 (1.873) 1.962 (1.108) 52
Note: In Game 3, the raw data for calculating the mean and standard de-
viation for the trustee’s transfer were obtained by averaging the individual
transfers elicited by the strategy method.
Hypothesis 1. If trustees’ preferences present concerns for
the vulnerability of trust, they will transfer more tokens in
the I-treatment than in the N-treatment.
In the I-treatment, higher transfers of tokens by trustees
do not imply per se a higher share of trustworthy choices
and, consequently, of trustworthy players. In other words,
when vulnerability is salient, it is conceivable that trustees’
behavioural strategies could imply more generous but not
yet fair transfers, which would leave unchanged the share of
trustworthy players. Hence, a second hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 2. If trustees’ preferences show concerns for
the vulnerability of trust, the share of trustworthy trustees is
larger in the I-treatment (“trustworthy” in the sense defined
above).
Irrespective of how trust vulnerability affects the level of
return transfers and the share of trustworthy people, its trans-
formative capacitymay also affect the reciprocity attitudes of
trustees. In fact, both an increase in the return transfer levels
and a higher share of trustworthy people may result simply
from an upward shift of trustees’ behavioural strategies. By
contrast, a change in the trustees’ reciprocity attitudes would
require a different association between trustors’ and trustees’
transfers, or in other words, a change in the slope of trustees’
return function, the amount returned as a function of the
amount received.
Hypothesis 3. Assuming concerns for the vulnerability of
trust, the slope of untrustworthy trustees’ return function is
higher in the I-treatment.
5 Results
Table 1 reports summary statistics by treatment, game and
type of players. First of all, both trustors and trustees transfer
on average non-zero amounts of tokens to their co-player. In
Game 1 of the N-treatment (vs. I-treatment), trustors sent
on average 3.077 (vs. 2.846) tokens to their respective co-
players; trustees responded by sending back on average 1.885
(vs. 1.712), which are still positive but lower than what full
reciprocity would imply. A set of t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests (p-values > 0.40) demonstrate that there is no statis-
tically significant difference in Game 1 between the average
amounts sent by trustor (vs. trustee) across treatments, show-
ing a successful random assignment of subjects in treatments
and roles.
Game 2 of the N-treatment was a close replica of the
previous game outcomes. On average, trustors transferred
3.192 tokens to their co-players who responded by sending
back 1.885 tokens. In the I-treatment a slight change in
the average behaviour was reported in Game 2: trustors and
trustees transferred 2.365 and 1.981 tokens, respectively.
Game 3 presents a different overall picture. In the N-
treatment (vs. I-treatment), trustors transferred on average
2.135 (vs. 2.731) tokens to trustees who in turn sent back
1.474 (vs. 1.962) tokens.
So far it is worth noticing that Game 1 was designed to
identify trustees’ trustworthiness; Game 2 was designed to
provide subjects with a first experience of the environment
we aim to study, while adopting amore intuitive choicemode
with a single unconditional decision.
By eliciting the entire set of conditional decisions, Game 3
was designed to efficiently provide the relevant information
to fully test the hypotheses stated in the previous section,
concerning the effect of vulnerability. Hence, following the
approach byFischbacher et al. (2001), we now focus our anal-
ysis largely on the set of trustees’ conditional decisions from
Game 3.5 Game 3, in using the strategy method, required
5Game 2 did not provide sufficient data for a test of the effect of vulner-
ability. The critical cases are those in which the trustee was not trustworthy
in Game 1, yet, despite this, the trustor transferred 4 or 5 tokens. There
were only 20 such cases, 13 in the N-treatment and 7 in the I-treatment.
When the trustor transferred less than 4, as we shall see, information had
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Figure 1: Tokens sent back in the N-treatment (left panel) and I-treatment (right panel) from Game 3 (strategy method).
trustees to indicate how they would respond if the trustor
were vulnerable in this test. Thus, every trustor provided a
response to this hypothetical case.
Figure 1 shows the individual Game 3 return functions
(amount returned as a function of the amount transferred
by the trustor) for the trustees who were not trustworthy in
Game 1, separately for the N-treatment and I-treatment. It is
apparent that the mean trustee return function (dashed lines,
with circular points) was a roughly linear function of the
amount transferred up to about 3 tokens, at which point the
trustee response start to become sensitive to the information
condition. In particular, trustees returned more when they
knew that the trustor was vulnerable, that is, the trustor
transferred 4 or 5 tokens despite knowing that the trustee
was not trustworthy (Hypothesis 1).
In Figure 1, red lines indicate that the intercept of the
linear model for each trustee was greater than 4 (as explained
shortly). It is apparent that many more trustees reciprocated
in full (i.e., in a way that would count as “trustworthy”) in
the I-treatment than in the N-treatment (Hypothesis 2, for
transfers of 4 or 5, p = .026, one-tailed Wilcoxon test on the
number of trustworthy responses [0, 1, or 2]).
To test the main hypotheses of interest (Hypotheses 1 and
3), we fit a straight line to the each trustee’s return function.
Two parameters of this fit were of interest: the intercept
when the trustor transferred 5 tokens, and the slope of the
line. The intercept assesses the response when the trustor
was most vulnerable. The slope assesses the sensitivity of
the trustor’s response to the amount transferred by the trustor.
Of particular interest were the responses of the 56 trustees
who were not trustworthy in Game 1.
T tests confirmed the apparent results of Figure 2. The
little effect, as the trustor was not so obviously vulnerable.
mean intercept was higher in the I-treatment (3.29) than the
N-treatment (2.25, t = 1.97, p = .027 one tailed), and the
slope was also higher (.62 vs. .40, t = 1.88, p = .032 one
tailed). The fact that the slope was higher casts doubt on an
interpretation in terms of increased altruism alone: the result
depends on the vulnerability resulting from a large transfer
from the trustor. It represents an effect of vulnerability on
reciprocity.
However, we found that both intercept and slope were also
strongly affected by individual differences in the trustees’
general willingness to return, as measured by their amount
returned in Game 2. (Game 1 did not provide additional
information; in regression models, its contribution was not
significant once Game 2 was included.) The amount re-
turned in Game 2 correlated .70 with the intercept and .52
with the slope, within the trustees whowere untrustworthy in
Game 1. The Game 2 returns were thus nuisance variables,
which contributed extraneous variance to the t tests just re-
ported. They represented pre-existing individual differences
in trustworthiness.
To reduce the effect of this extraneous variance, we re-
gressed slope and intercept on information treatment and
Game 2 returns, for the trustees who were not trustworthy in
Game 1. The regression coefficient for the effect of informa-
tion treatment on intercept was 1.16 (p = .001 one tailed),
and the coefficient for the effect on slope was 0.24 (p = .010
one tailed). For trustees who were trustworthy in Game 1,
information condition had no effect on slope or intercept.
In sum, the results support the hypothesis that previously
untrustworthy trustees are more likely to reciprocate high
transfers when they know that the trustor knows that they
were previously untrustworthy than when they do not know.
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6 Concluding remarks
Our experiment has consistently shown across treatments
that when trustors’ vulnerability is linked to the trustee’s
revealed trustworthiness and is made salient by providing
relevant information to the players, trustees do change their
behaviour by increasing the amount of tokens transferred.
In those circumstances, both trustworthy and untrustworthy
trustees make more generous transfers, and the degrees of
trustworthiness and reciprocity of trustees’ behaviour rise.
Thus, the transformative nature of vulnerable trust finds con-
sistent support as shown by its capacity of generating higher,
more trustworthy and reciprocal transfers by trustees. Vul-
nerability has shown a transformative capacity.
Our empirical regularities may serve as additional “ex-
hibits” (Sugden, 2003) to be viewed – from a theoretical
standpoint – through the lens of intention-based theories,
which model other-regarding preferences in the form of reci-
procity towards co-players (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg &
Kirchsteiger, 2004) or aversion to guilt resulting from unful-
filled expectations (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007).6
Furthermore, it is easy to envision relevant fields where
our results may suggest policy implications and, in gen-
eral, reflections and suggestions. For instance, a manager
adopting subsidiarity management should intervene in team
decisions only for activities that would be worse without
her subsidiary intervention (Melé, 2004). For subsidiarity
management to work, it is essential that teammembers expe-
rience managers’ genuine, vulnerable trust. Manager should
then avoid trying to control or “contractualise” the entire
process to prevent possible abuse of trust. A key issue in
subsidiarity management is the resilience after a crisis due
to betrayal of trust when untrustworthiness is known to the
organization, which wants to keep its culture of trust. Our
results support the effectiveness of subsidiarity and the im-
portance of giving new trust to team members who appeared
to be untrustworthy.
Subsidiarity is essential also in education, where teachers
have to create an environment of genuine trust in order to
elicit responsibility and freedom. Trusting children, young-
sters, and adults with a past of untrustworthiness is a key
factor on which the success of the education process hinges.
Our results suggest that making salient trustors’ (i.e., teacher
or social worker) vulnerability may produce a truly transfor-
mative effect on trustees (Horsburgh, 1960).
Finally, we hope that our study will stimulate replications
and further research to accumulate systematic knowledge on
trust in non-enforceable, personalised interactions, and may
promote trust as behavioural disposition, as social norms
(e.g., Baron, 1998; Dunning et al., 2014), in organisations
and beyond.
6Intention-based models of aversion to guilt may encompass comple-
mentary evidence as, for instance, the one reported by Butler et al. (2016),
who link individuals’ cheating notions to guilt aversion, and trust.
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